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____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Ethel R. Leecan ("Mrs. Leecan"), appeals a
declaratory judgment of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in favor of appellee, Clifford
Irene Huff ("Huff").

This district court's judgment declared

that Huff was the legal spouse of William N. Leecan ("Mr. Leecan"
or "the decedent") at the time of his death.

Both women claimed

entitlement to decedent's federal employee survivor benefits as
his surviving spouse.

This case arose when the Director of the

United States Office of Personnel Management ("USOPM") requested
both claimants to file this action asking the district court to
judicially determine who was Mr. Leecan's spouse at the time of
his death.
For purposes of determining who is a spouse entitled to
survivors' benefits, USOPM looks to applicable state law.

It

will apply the law of the state with the most significant
interest in the marital status of the employee.

The only two

states whose law could apply to the dispute between Mrs. Leecan
and Huff are Pennsylvania and Texas.

We believe that

Pennsylvania law would control in this case, as it has the
greater interest in the marital status of the now deceased
government employee.

The district court did not do a choice of

laws analysis but concluded instead that the outcome would be the

same under either Texas or Pennsylvania law.

It then looked to

Pennsylvania case law and held that Huff was the legal spouse of
the decedent at the time of Mr. Leecan's death absent proof of
divorce or annulment of his marriage to her.
We think that the district court erred in analyzing
Pennsylvania law and concluding that Pennsylvania has an
absolutely inflexible rule that a second marriage is always
invalid in the absence of strict proof of a divorce decree or
annulment of the first marriage.

The Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania has specifically instructed courts applying that
state's domestic relations law to perform a balancing test by
weighing the evidence in the record to determine which of two
presumptions, one in favor of continuation of the first marriage
and the other in favor of the validity of the second marriage, is
more easily sustained by the evidence.

Concluding that the

second presumption could never apply in the absence of strict
formal proof of termination of the first marriage, the district
court failed to do this.

Therefore, we will remand this case to

the district court so that it can properly balance the
presumption in favor of the first marriage against the one
favoring the second.

In adjusting that balance, we think no

mechanical rule will suffice.

Instead, we think the court should

consider the conduct of both parties and their respective
contributions to the stability of the family each chose to
support or deny in light of the value our society attributes to
traditional families and evolving conditions of family life in
this nation.

On remand, we also think the district court should

make an express finding as to when and how Huff first learned of
the decedent's marriage to Mrs. Leecan and the reasons for her
lack of curiosity for twenty-eight years about the man she now
claims as her husband.

I.
Huff and the decedent were married in 1956 in Victoria
County, Texas.1

Shortly thereafter, they moved to Philadelphia.

They had no children together.

In 1961, they separated and Huff

returned to Victoria County, Texas.

Huff continued her residence

there until 1964 when she moved to Houston in Harris County,
Texas.

The decedent continued to live in Philadelphia.

In 1962,

Huff commenced divorce proceedings against the decedent in
Victoria County, Texas.
prosecution in 1964.

The action was dismissed for lack of

A record search of Victoria and Harris

Counties, Texas, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania produced no
record of divorce or annulment.2

1

. Mrs. Leecan argues that Huff's marriage to the decedent was
invalid because Huff was only seventeen years of age at the time.
This impediment renders the marriage merely voidable, not void.
Because Huff did not, at any time, disclose this impediment to
the district court and because a declaratory judgment is an
equitable remedy, Mrs. Leecan also argues that Huff should be
precluded from recovery because she did not come into court with
clean hands. Huff and the decedent continued to live together as
husband and wife after Huff attained the age of majority, and no
action for annulment was commenced within sixty days of the
marriage ceremony. See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3303,
3305(a)(2) (1991). Therefore, we reject these arguments.
2

. Texas law requires a plaintiff in a divorce action to have
resided in the county where the action was filed for six months
prior to institution of the action. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

Huff later took up residence with Thomas Bennett and
had three children with him, all bearing the surname Bennett.

On

the children's birth certificates, Huff's name is given as Irene
Bennett.

Huff never married Bennett.
Following his separation from Huff, the decedent was

hired by the United States Post Office in Philadelphia.

His

employment there entitled his spouse to federal survivor annuity
benefits.

On November 8, 1967, the decedent completed his death

benefit form naming Ethel Leecan as his wife.

Three days later,

on November 11, 1967, the decedent and Ethel Leecan, after
obtaining a Pennsylvania marriage license, were married.3

The

decedent, in applying for the marriage license, declared that he
had never been married before.

Following their marriage, the

decedent and Mrs. Leecan held themselves out as husband and wife,
bought property together and had two children together.4
Decedent died in an automobile accident in June of
(..continued)
§ 3.21 (West 1994). Huff appears to have resided only in Harris
and Victoria Counties, Texas.
]3. Decedent's designation of "Ethel Leecan" as his beneficiary
would be ineffective if she is not his wife. Only spouses and
certain unmarried children are entitled to death benefits under
the Federal Employees Health Benefit's Program. See 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 8341 (West Supp. 1994). Indeed, the Death Benefits
Registration Form in which decedent listed his spouse as
"Ethel R." identified the family member eligible for death
benefits. See Appendix ("App.") at Doc. 14.
4

. The ages of the decedent's children do not appear in the
record. If we assume that any children born to Mr. and Mrs.
Leecan were born after the date of Mr. Leecan's attempt to
contract a valid ceremonial marriage to Mrs. Leecan in 1967 and
the decedent's death in 1971, these children would today be
between the ages of 23 and 27.

1971.

Later that same year Mrs. Leecan began collecting

survivors' benefits as his spouse.

Not until about eighteen

years later, in 1989, did Huff petition the USOPM to award her
any survivors' benefits due Mr. Leecan's spouse.5

Thus, Huff and

Mrs. Leecan now both claim entitlement to benefits as the legal
spouse decedent at the time of his death.

Initially, USOPM

awarded Huff a retroactive payment of $58,819.20 and ordered Mrs.
Leecan to repay the benefits she had received over the eighteen
years that preceded Huff's petition, but USOPM reversed this
decision after deciding that Huff had waited too long to
challenge decedent's marriage to Mrs. Leecan and ordered Huff to
repay the retroactive award.
At the urging of USOPM, both parties filed an action in
the district court seeking a declaratory judgment determining who
was the legal spouse of the decedent under applicable state law
at the time of his death.

USOPM suspended all benefit payments

and efforts to collect repayments pending the district court's
decision.
Huff filed a motion for summary judgment which the
district court denied, holding that there was sufficient evidence
at the summary judgment stage to overcome Pennsylvania's
presumption of favoring the continued existence of the first
marriage.

This evidence included testimony that the decedent

believed he had been divorced, that he told others he had
5

. Applications for survivor annuities may be filed within
thirty years of the death of an employee. See 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 8345(i)(2) (1980).

obtained a divorce from Huff, that he had children with Mrs.
Leecan, and that Huff never attempted to contact the decedent
until eighteen years after the decedent's death and almost
twenty-eight years after her separation from him.
Later, at a bench trial, other evidence showed the
decedent told Mrs. Leecan he had been married previously but that
this marriage had been annulled and decedent's half-brother also
testified that the decedent had told him before he married Mrs.
Leecan that his marriage to Huff had been annulled.

He also

testified that Mr. Leecan had hosted a party to celebrate his
annulment.
Unfortunately for Mrs. Leecan, the district court did
not credit this testimony, but found instead there was no
credible evidence that the decedent and Huff were ever divorced
or that their marriage was ever annulled.

The district court did

not expressly find that Huff lacked knowledge of Mr. Leecan's
subsequent marriage to Mrs. Leecan but did find, "she had not had
any contact with him or any knowledge about him since prior to
his death in 1971."

Appendix ("App.") at Exhibit 4, p.6

(District Court oral op.).
Mrs. Leecan did not raise any conflict of law issues
before the district court, nor did she or Mrs. Huff object to the
district court's application of Pennsylvania law to the question
of who was Mr. Leecan's spouse at the time of his death.

The

district court, without deciding whether Texas or Pennsylvania
law applied, concluded that the outcome would have been the same
under the law of either state.

Because there was no evidence that the decedent and
Huff were ever divorced, or that their marriage had been
annulled, the district court held that Mr. Leecan's second
marriage to Ethel Leecan was void ab initio.

It went on to

conclude that Huff was still legally married to the decedent at
the time of his death but noted, "[t]his result may seem
inequitable under the facts of this case."

Id. at Exhibit 4,

p.7.
Mrs. Leecan filed a timely notice of appeal.6

6

. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332 because of diversity of citizenship. We have
appellate jurisdiction over Leecan's appeal from the district
court's final order granting the declaratory judgment under 28
U.S.C.A. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the district
court's decision that no conflict of laws analysis was required
and that under the law of Pennsylvania Huff was the legal spouse
of the decedent at the time of his death. Epstein Family
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).
Any subsidiary factual findings, however, are subject to the
clearly erroneous standard of review. Id.

II.
In deciding who is entitled to federal survivor
benefits, USOPM looks to state common law to define marriage and
to determine who is the legal widow of the decedent:
"Marriage" means a marriage recognized in law
or equity under the whole of the jurisdiction
with the most significant interest in the
marital status of the employee, Member or
retiree unless the law of that jurisdiction
is contrary to the public policy of the
United States. If a jurisdiction would
recognize more than one marriage in law or
equity, the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) will recognize only one marriage, but
will defer to the local court to determine
which marriage should be recognized.

5 C.F.R. § 831.603 (1994) (emphasis added).

The only question

before us on appeal of this declaratory judgment action is who
was the legal spouse of William Leecan when he died in 1971.
In deciding this issue, we agree with the district
court that it is unnecessary to perform a conflicts analysis as
the result is the same under either Texas or Pennsylvania law.
Compare In re Estate of Watt, 185 A.2d 781, 785-86 (Pa. 1962)
(discussed infra) with Parson v. Parson, 387 S.W.2d 764, 766
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (if previous marriage has not been
terminated by divorce, annulment or death of prior spouse, party
does not have capacity to enter into second marriage and any
attempted second marriage is void ab initio); Hudspeth v.
Hudspeth, 198 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (Texas law
presumes validity of second marriage and that presumption
prevails until it is rebutted "by evidence which negatives the

effective operation of every possible means by which a
dissolution of the prior marriage could have taken place"); see
also 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1702 (1991); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 2.22 (West 1994).
In any event, to the extent that there are any material
differences in the law of Texas and Pennsylvania, we believe
standard conflicts analysis points to Pennsylvania law.
Pennsylvania had the "most significant interest in the marital
status of the employee."
added).

5 C.F.R. § 831.603 (1994) (emphasis

Although Huff and the decedent were married in Texas,

they moved to Pennsylvania shortly after their marriage in 1956
and they resided here until their separation in 1961.

Mrs.

Leecan's marriage to the decedent occurred in Pennsylvania and
they resided there until decedent died.

In addition, the

decedent's federal employment was in Pennsylvania.

The only

contacts with Texas are Huff's marriage to Leecan and Huff's
longtime residence there.

See Headon v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 252

F.2d 739, 742-43 (3d Cir. 1958) (giving great weight to forum
state's presumptions where parties lived in forum during most of
marital relationship).
Pennsylvania law has two conflicting presumptions, both
of which apply in this case.

The first presumption is that a

valid first marriage continues until it is proven to be dissolved
by death, divorce or annulment.

Watt, 185 A.2d at 785.

The

second presumes the innocence and validity of a second marriage.
Id.

In case a conflict between these presumptions arises, we are

advised "that presumption should yield which from the evidence

and inferences therefrom render it the least probable to
sustain."

Id. at 786.7
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered the impact

of these two presumptions in In re Estate of Watt.

In Watt, in

upholding the first marriage, the supreme court stated that any
subsequent marriage is void unless the first marriage is
dissolved in some manner.

Id. at 785.

It went on to say that

even assuming the second wife "acted in the utmost of good faith
and in reliance upon [a fraudulent] decree of divorce, per se
such good faith and reliance on her part would not breathe
vitality into her marriage to decedent unless, in fact, decedent
had the legal capacity to enter into such a marriage."

Id.

Therefore, to overcome the first presumption, there must be proof
of facts and circumstances that make it apparent that the first
marriage has been dissolved or the spouse has died.

Id.; see In

re Estate of Henry, 353 A.2d 812, 813-15 (Pa. 1976) (because
there was no evidence of divorce between deceased and his first
wife or that deceased's first wife died prior to deceased's
second marriage, first marriage was valid unless during trial, on
remand from grant of summary judgment, second wife could prove
that first marriage had never been consummated and decedent had
never lived together with first wife, as she alleged).

7

. Texas law also presumes the validity of the second marriage,
but that presumption is destroyed by evidence which negates the
effective operation of every possible means by which dissolution
of the prior marriage could have taken place. See Hudspeth, 198
S.W.2d at 770 (citations omitted).

At the same time, the supreme court recognized that it
had to reconcile this presumption in favor of the continuing
validity of the first marriage with a competing presumption:
"the presumption of innocence in contracting a second marriage as
well as the presumption of the validity of a second marriage, the
former furnishing the rationale for the latter."
at 785.

Watt, 185 A.2d

"Underlying [these latter] presumptions is the theory

that parties to the second marriage did so innocently and without
criminal or wrongful purpose or intent and that the law will
infer matrimony rather than concubinage."

Id.

Where children

have been born of the second marriage, as in Mrs. Leecan's case,
the presumption of legitimacy considerably strengthens the
presumption of the validity of the second marriage.
n.6.

Id. at 785

The birth of children is not sufficient, in itself,

however, to rebut the presumption in favor of the continuing
validity of the first marriage.

See In re Estate of Henry, 353

A.2d at 814; see also Johnson v. J.H. Terry & Co., 126 A.2d 793,
797 (Pa. Super. 1956), aff'd, 133 A.2d 234 (Pa. 1957).

A long

period of absence or desertion, as well as the fact that the
first spouse may have also remarried, and proof that the decedent
recognized the validity of the second marriage, may also support
the second presumption.

See In re Estate of D'Ippolito, 218 A.2d

224, 225 (Pa. 1966) (where twenty-four year period elapsed
between time decedent was deserted by her first husband and her
second marriage, and where whereabouts of first husband continued
to be unknown and decedent had attempted to locate him prior to
her second marriage, continuance of decedent's first marriage, so

as to defeat second husband's right to decedent's estate, was not
established).
In deciding how to balance these conflicting
presumptions the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Watt, cited
Madison v. Lewis, 30 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. 1943), with
approval.
"When a valid marriage is proven the law
presumes that it continues until the death of
one of the parties (actual or presumptive
after seven years), or a divorce is shown.
Without either of these appearing if one of
the parties marries again, while another
presumption arises that it is innocent, that
alone is not sufficient to overcome the
previously existing presumption of the
continued validity of the first marriage.
The second presumption does not of itself
destroy the first but requires some proof of
facts and circumstances to be given the
effect of overcoming the first; as for
instance, the long lapse of time during which
the other party may be presumed to have died,
the question of legitimacy of a child of the
second marriage, the fact that the other
spouse had likewise remarried, proof that the
decedent, whose heirs are attacking the
second marriage, had himself recognized the
validity of it."

Watt, 185 A.2d at 785-86 (quoting Madison, 30 A.2d at 360)
(footnote & citations omitted); cf. In re Estate of Bruce, 538
A.2d 923, 923 (Pa. Super. 1988).

In our case there is evidence

that the decedent himself had recognized the second marriage as
valid, two children were born of the second marriage, there was a
long lapse of time, approximately twenty-eight years, during
which the decedent and Huff had no contact with one another, and

Huff lived with another man, used his surname and had children
with him.
The Watt court continued:
From the presumption in favor of the validity
of the second marriage and the presumption of
innocence upon the part of the parties to
that marriage there follows, as a corollary,
another presumption i. e. that either death
or divorce had terminated the prior marriage,
and he who claims the invalidity of the
second marriage must over come that . . .
presumption by proof of some nature. The
presumption that a first marriage has been
terminated by death or divorce is neither
absolute nor inflexible and each case must be
resolved on the basis of its own facts and
circumstances and such inferences as fairly
arise and can be reasonably drawn from them.

Watt, 185 A.2d at 786 (citations omitted).
We believe the real thrust of the several presumptions
is to place the burden of proving the invalidity of the second
marriage upon the person who claims such invalidity and we think
that requires proof of some nature that the first marriage was
not dissolved by death or divorce at the time of the second
marriage.

Id. at 785-86; but see Headen v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,

252 F.2d at 741 ("The validity of the marriage in question [the
second marriage] may be sustained only if there is proof of the
dissolution of [the first marriage]."); D'Ippolito, 218 A.2d at
225 ("[T]he burden remains upon the party supporting the validity
of the subsequent marriage to produce such facts as will shift
the burden of proof back to the party supporting the validity of
the prior marriage.").

While Pennsylvania cases exhibit

considerable confusion about who has the burden of proving the
termination of the first marriage and the strength of the
evidence that is needed to establish that fact, they indicate to
us the absence of an entirely mechanical rule and, under the
circumstances of this case, we believe that Huff should bear the
burden of proving the first marriage was not dissolved at the
time of the second marriage.
As the district court recognized in denying Huff's
motion for summary judgment, there is evidence which could
overcome the presumption of the continued existence of the first
marriage.

This evidence includes the fact that the decedent

advised others that he had obtained a divorce from Huff, Mrs.
Leecan and the decedent had two children together in the second
marriage and Huff bore decedent no children.

Huff used the

surname of her children's father, a man with whom she lived, in
her correspondence with USOPM and on the birth certificates of
her children, and Huff never attempted to contact the decedent
until eighteen years after his death and twenty-eight years after
their separation.

The district court nevertheless declined to

balance the conflicting presumptions but instead held if there is
no divorce decree or annulment of the first marriage, the second
is automatically void ab initio.

We think this reading of

Pennsylvania law renders the second presumption meaningless; no
weighing of the evidence is even necessary because a second
marriage automatically becomes void ab initio unless a decree of
divorce or annulment is produced.

This seems to us contrary to

the state supreme court's analysis in Watt.

Because there was

evidence supporting each presumption, we think that the district
court should have weighed one against the other in light of the
social value of each claimant's conduct and the contribution of
each to the family which Mr. Leecan wanted to benefit with funds
which he treated as his own after Mrs. Huff returned to Texas and
entered into a relationship with another man that produced a
separate family which Mr. Leecan not only had no contact with,
but knew nothing about.

Rather than weighing the competing

presumptions favoring Mr. Leecan's first and second marriages, as
suggested by Watt, the district court ended its analysis with a
rule of law that no divorce or termination of the first marriage
had been proven and therefore the second marriage was void ab
initio.

We do not criticize the district court for doing so

because there are indeed indications in Pennsylvania case law
that such a strict rule exists, and we recognize the strong need
for certainty and definiteness in the rules governing a status so
important to society's well being as marriage.

Nevertheless, it

seems to us that inflexible application of a rule requiring,
without exception, that the first marriage be shown conclusively
to terminate before the second can be recognized would make the
competing presumption in favor of the validity of the second
marriage meaningless.

Because that presumption also has strong

underpinnings in desirable social policy, we do not think
Pennsylvania would totally ignore it under the circumstances that
this case presents.
Moreover, the district court may have erred in
concluding that Huff had conclusively demonstrated that no

divorce or annulment existed based only upon a search of the
court records in Victoria and Harris Counties, Texas and
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

In Pennsylvania, there is no six-

month residency requirement as in Texas and the requirement of
venue may be waived by entry of a general appearance by
defendant, see Chasman v. Chasman, 53 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super. 1947);
see also Shields v. Folsom, 153 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
This record does not show that all counties in Pennsylvania were
searched to establish conclusively that there was no divorce or
annulment here.

Thus, although the evidence shows that Huff

resided only in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Victoria and
Harris Counties, Texas, we are not convinced that the record
search Huff offered was broad enough to be conclusive.
Finally, even assuming Huff can establish on remand
that no divorce or annulment exists and the district court
concludes the presumptions balance in her favor, we believe it
also erred in failing to make a finding as to when Huff learned
of the decedent's marriage to Mrs. Leecan.

California and Texas

law persuasively support the equitable principles that Watt seems
to foreshadow and later Pennsylvania law does not preclude.
USOPM decisions concerning entitlement use similar principles.
Thus, USOPM may bar the first wife from asserting a claim as the
legal surviving spouse where she unreasonably delayed taking
legal action to challenge the validity of her husband's later
marriage within a reasonable time after gaining knowledge of it.
See Jacobs v. Office of Personnel Management, 13 M.S.P.R. 23, 26
(1982) (citing United States v. George-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92,

96 (9th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Brown, 79 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Cal. App.
1969), modified, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Cal App. 1969)); see also
Simpson v. Simpson, 380 S.W.2d 855, 859-60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
We agree that Huff would not be barred from challenging the
validity of the second marriage if she knew only that the
decedent "had a woman."

Brief of Appellant at 11.

clearly insufficient under Watt.

This is

See Watt, 185 A.2d at 790 n.9.

The district court, however, failed to make any finding on when
Huff learned of decedent's second marriage.

For all these

reasons, we conclude this case should be remanded to the district
court for further proceedings.8

III.
For the foregoing reasons we will vacate the order of
the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

8

. We note that the district court was itself troubled by the
length of time between the decedent's death and Huff's claim of
entitlement to the survivor benefits as well as the inequitable
result if Mrs. Leecan were now ordered to repay the $58,819.20
she was previously awarded through no fault or bad faith on her
part. Thus, the equitable doctrines of laches and equitable
estoppel, as well as waiver of overpayment under OPM regulations,
may be applicable in fashioning a final benefits award even if
the district court concludes after balancing the conflicting
presumptions in light of all the evidence that Mrs. Huff has
established a continuing validity of the marriage to Mr. Leecan
and the consequent invalidity of his second marriage to Mrs.
Leecan.

